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Abstract
Seventy-eight participants were randomly assigned to receive either a serene, neutral, or fearful
mood induction, followed by either a neutral salience or mortality salience induction. After these
manipulations, participants read a political essay that opposed their world view. Participants then
completed several measures examining how much they liked/did not like the author of the essay,
along with a measure assessing their opinion on an ethnic out-group. It was hypothesized that
participants who received the serene mood induction would derogate the author of the opposing
essay and ethnic out-group members significantly less than those who received the fearful or
neutral mood manipulation. After conducting a 2 x 3 ANOVA, no significant interactions were
found between mood and salience, but there were several main effects of mood and salience that
approached significance. However, exploratory analysis revealed that participants in the fearful
mood condition derogated the ethnic out-group significantly more than those in the neutral or
serene mood conditions. Additionally, participants in the mortality salience condition derogated
the author of the essay significantly more than those in the neutral salience condition.
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The Impact of “Fearful” and “Serene” Mood on Mortality Salience
Human diversity is vast: thousands of languages, traditions, superstitions, societal
structures, and artistic styles are practiced throughout the world. Even within this diversity, all
cultures cook food, communicate with language, avoid incest, bury their dead, form kinship
groups, and experience aggression (Pinker, 2002). Humanity’s propensity to wage wars leads to
degradation of land, resources, and people. In an attempt to understand the mechanisms behind
human aggression, social psychologists have been applying Terror Management Theory.
Review of Terror Management Theory (TMT)
Terror Management theory (TMT) (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt,
Veeder, Kirkland, & Lyon, 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989)
provides a mechanism for out-group derogation. Out-group derogation is harsh criticism or
aggression directed at groups to which one does not belong, such as a different political
affiliation, race, or ethnicity. TMT researchers posit that humans, like other animals, possess an
innate desire to survive. Unlike other species though, humans possess a unique capacity to
understand that life is only temporary. These two conflicting notions—the need to survive and
knowledge of eventual death—allegedly produce terror within human beings (McGregor,
Lieberman, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, Simon, & Pyszczynski, 1998). In fact, TMT
researchers suggest that death is the most terrifying concept for humans. Car crashes, disease,
and even the SAT’s all evoke distress, but unlike these scary events, death produces an even
greater terror within humans because it is the only life event that is truly inevitable (Pyszczynski,
Motyl, Abdollahi, 2009; Landau, Johns, Greenberg, Pyszczysnki, Martens, Goldenberg and
Solomon, 2004).
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According to TMT researchers, when people encounter a situation that reminds them of
their death, they experience a loss of personal security and identity, known as “death anxiety”
(McGregor et al., 1998). Because it is difficult to find security within the self, one must turn to
in-groups (groups an individual strongly associates with) for security. TMT researchers propose
that people relieve death-anxiety by maintaining self-esteem and living up to their cultural
worldview. High self-esteem may increase personal security and this prevents the individual
from being disturbed by thoughts of death. By maintaining the cultural standards set by their ingroup, people build self-esteem and figuratively escape death via religion or tradition. For
example, many religions offers immortality through belief in supernatural principles, numerous
deities, or a single God. Specifically, even though an individual’s life may end, other members
of the in-group continue perpetuating tradition, providing the individual with symbolic
immortality (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; Pyszczynski, Greenberg,
Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; Pyszczynski, 2013).
According to this model, when people experience death related thoughts coupled with an
opposing worldview, they can either support their in-group or derogate the opposing out-group to
relieve the ensuing death anxiety. Supporting the in-group may help people escape the threat of
death as in-groups offer security and symbolic immortality, and derogation of out-groups
reassures people that they have been living by the correct worldview. Reassurance that one is
living by the correct worldview raises personal security and ensures that symbolic immortality is
reached. A clear example of out-group derogation used to manage death-anxiety and threatening
worldviews is demonstrated by McGregor et al. (1998).
McGregor et al. (1998) induced mortality salience (MS) (unconscious fear of death) to
one group, and neutral salience to another. MS was induced by having participants write about
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their own death and neutral salience was evoked by having participants write about an upcoming
trip to the dentist. After completing the salience manipulation, the participants read a political
position paper that opposed their beliefs. They were then told to prepare a sample of hot sauce in
a cup for the author of the position paper they had just read. Participants believed the author
would have to consume all of the hot sauce. McGregor et al. (1998) found that those who had
been induced with MS gave a significantly greater amount of hot sauce to the opposing author
than those who had not received the MS. Therefore, McGregor et al. (1998) concluded that the
unconscious threat of death may have caused the participants to behave more violently towards
an individual with an opposing opinion in order to enhance personal identity and self-esteem.
Furthermore, although a dental exam can produce significant duress, participants in the dental
exam salient condition allocated significantly less hot sauce to the opposing author. These
findings suggest that the threat of death is especially salient to humans and may carry an impact
unlike other anxiety evoking events.
Further supporting the claim of a specialized fear of death, many studies have shown that
typically fearful situations do not evoke in-group support or out-group derogation. Having
subjects write about dental pain (Jonas, Greenberg & Frey, 2003; Landau et al., 2006;
Schmeichel, Galliot, Filardo, McGregor, Gilter, & Baumesiter, 2009), an upcoming exam
(Landau et al., 2006) extreme physical pain (Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg,
Cohen, & Weise, 2006), uncertainty (Landau, Johns, Greenberg, Psyzczynski, Martens,
Goldenberg, & Solomon,2004), or moving away from friends and family members (Schimel,
Wohl, & Williams, 2006) did not produce any significant out-group derogations or increased
support toward the in-group. These findings suggest that death anxiety is processed differently
than other forms of anxiety.
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Additional studies using a variety of measures have shown an increase in out-group
derogation after MS. After MS, for example, participants are more derogatory towards
prostitutes (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), are more derogatory
towards Islamic and Arab groups (Kesebir, 2014), and are less likely to forgive someone
(Schimel et al., 2006). Furthermore, Pyszczynski et al. (2006) found that when primed with MS,
Iranian students are more likely to support martyrdom and aggression towards America and
likewise, Americans are more likely to support aggressive military action in the Middle East.
Alternative Theories
Although TMT has garnered support, researchers have proposed alternative causes to outgroup derogation. A study by Fritsche, Jonas, and Fankhanel (2008) manipulated MS in which
one group received the traditional mortality induction and another group was asked to write
about suicide (a self-determined death). Fritsche et al. (2008) found that when one was in charge
of his or her own death (i.e., suicide), he/she did not feel the need to derogate. This contradicts
the original TMT model, where death is the ultimate loss of identity and instigates the need for
people to symbolically bolster themselves through in-group support and out-group derogation.
Fritsche et al. (2008) claimed that suicide does not cause one to derogate because suicide does
not signify a loss of control. With suicide, people determine their own death and therefore power
is still within the individual. Fritsche et al. (2008) posits that death does not possess a symbolic
loss of identity, but rather a loss of personal control which then leads one to derogate. Death
outside of suicide just happens to be the ultimate loss of human control. In the present study,
participants may experience a loss of control via the traditional MS manipulation.

9

Mortality Salience Buffers
Regardless of whether derogation is a result of MS or a lack of internal control,
researchers are investigating buffers that prevent derogation from occurring in the first place.
Many studies have examined the buffering effects of self-esteem on MS. Arndt and Greenberg
(1999) found that individuals with high self-esteem are less likely to derogate after an MS
induction. If people have a strong sense of implicit self-esteem—an inherent faith in oneself to
succeed—they have a natural cognitive buffer to ward off threats to personal security, and
therefore do not need to derogate after MS (Schmeichel, Galliot, Filardo, McGregor, Gilter, &
Baumesiter, 2009). Additionally, Schmeichel et al. (2009) found that when self-esteem is
artificially induced, individuals with artificially high self-esteem derogate less after MS than
those with baseline self-esteem.
Several other buffers have been examined that may ward off death-anxiety. High
internal locus-of control (Talati, Fritsche, Du, Jonas, & Castano, 2013), belongingness to a
religious affiliation (Castano, 2004), having close relationships (Mikulincer, Florian, &
Hirschberger, 2004), and having children (Zhou, Lei, Marley, & Chen, 2009) have all been found
to buffer morality salience. Participants who were primed to “think rationally” rather than
“experientially” reported less derogation to the out-group (Simon, Greenberg, Harmon-Jones,
Solomon, Pyszczynski, Arndt, & Abend, 1997.) Simon et al. (1997) posits that TMT activates an
unconscious, instinct-driven system, and therefore reminding participants that they are capable of
logical, effortful thinking may prevent derogation.
Furthermore, using themes from lay epistemology, Kruglanski (1989) and Landau et al.
(2004) examined the extent to which MS influenced participant’s need to categorize and
structure people into social groups. Landau et al. (2004) had participants read two inconsistent
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essays about a fictional character and then answer questions about the character. They found that
those in the MS condition were more influenced by the first paragraph when forming their
opinion of the character and hence were more affected by primacy. Landau et al. (2004)
concluded that the existential uncertainty evoked by MS produces a need to generalize
individuals into groups. The clarity of structure produces a sense of security within the
individual. On a similar vein, Dechesne, Janssen, and van Knippenberg (2000) measured
participant’s personal need for structure. They found that those who are more uncomfortable
with uncertainty were more likely to be affected by MS. These two studies support that MS
increases an individual’s need for structure, and that those who do not feel a pressing need for
structure are buffered against anxiety and derogation.
Lastly, Kesebir (2014) found that the trait “humility” may be an existential death buffer,
in which those who possess high levels of humility and low levels of entitlement are less likely
to derogate after MS. To experimentally induce feelings of humility, Kesebir (2014) had
participants in the “humility” condition write about a time when they felt humbled. After MS
was induced, Kesebir (2014) found that participants in the experimentally humble group reported
a significantly lower “death anxiety” than did those in baseline. Surprisingly, Kesebir (2014)
found that those who were induced with humility and MS were actually less fearful of death than
the control who had not been induced with MS. In conclusion, it appears that MS can actually
produce positive effects among individuals with already high levels of humility and low levels of
entitlement. Kesebir (2014) suggest that those who possess humility may already have a stable
and realistic view of the world, and therefore do not experience death as a threat and do not need
to artificially bolster self-esteem via derogation.
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In sum, a wide variety of psychological mechanisms may have the potential to protect
individuals from derogation after MS. High implicit self-esteem, logical thinking, comfort with
uncertainty, and high humility are all psychological features that may inhibit derogatory
sentiments towards out-groups. Further research on possible death-anxiety buffers is imperative
to the field of TMT, as buffers have the potential to encourage cooperation between unlike
groups.
Affect and TMT
Measuring mood. Another potential anxiety buffer against MS could be mood. An
intriguing aspect of TMT research is the seemingly absent change in affect after the MS
induction. Because of the grim nature of the MS manipulation, researchers assumed writing
about death would produce a drop in mood. However, studies have found no change in mood
after the MS manipulation (McGregor et al., 1998; Simon et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 2004;
Schimel et al., 2006; Schemichel et al., 2009; Pyszczynski, Motyl, & Abdollahi, 2009). The
PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a scale designed to capture temporary mood, in which
participants rate their current mood state in regards to 40 mood relevant adjectives. Not only is
the PANAS-X used frequently in mood research, but it is routinely administered after MS in the
classic TMT design (McGregor et al., 1998; Greenberg et al., 1994; Landau et al., 2006.)
Because of this lack of mood-change, researchers conclude that MS must utilize a psychological
mechanism that does not involve affective processes. Although many researchers are skeptical
that a special, discrete mechanism exists for death threat, this explanation has been the accepted
rule for approximately thirty years (Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010, Arndt, Allen, &
Greenberg, 2001; Simon, Greenberg, Harmon-Jones, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Arndt, & Abend,
1997).
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TMT and fear. Not until recently has this assumption about mood and TMT been
addressed. Contrary to the majority of TMT research, Lambert, Eadeh, Peak, Scherer, Schott,
and Slochower (2014) found a significant change in mood after MS. Rather than using the
PANAS-X, Lambert et al. (2014) used a narrow mood-measure and reported a large increase in
participant fear levels. Lambert et al. (2014) suggests that previous TMT studies did not detect
change in mood because the PANAS-X is too broad of a measure. Within the PANAS-X,
negative mood words such as “jittery” and “hostile” are grouped together in order to calculate an
overall “negative mood” score. This grouping of emotions does not allow for the detection of
subtle mood differences. “Anger” and “sadness” are two qualitatively different emotions, and
therefore separate scales must be used to chart individual affective fluctuations. In order to hone
in on specific emotions, Lambert et al. (2014) chose three anxiety related items (nervous,
anxious, worried,  = .86) and three fear related items (afraid, frightened, scared,  = .92) from
the PANAS-X along with the addition of the similar word “fearful.” Composite scores of the
“fear” words and “anxiety” words were calculated in order to have a single measure of “fear”
and “anxiety”. Only after calculating these separate mood scores was Lambert et al. (2014) able
to detect a non-significant but directional increase in anxiety and a significant increase in fear
after MS.
Lambert et al. (2014) points out another contradictory element of past TMT research: the
traditional TMT model suggests that death-anxiety operates on a special level that does not
involve affect. However, TMT researchers propose that non-life threatening anxiety should
involve a change in affect. This assumption is problematic because TMT researchers rarely find
changes in affect after mood inductions that are intended to produce affect change. For example,
change in affect is rarely reported after dental-exam anxiety inductions, test-taking inductions, or

13

inductions when participants must write about a romantic partner leaving them. Lambert et al.
(2014) claims this logical fallacy is produced due to a faulty measuring tool commonly used in
TMT research. The PANAS-X and other similar mood measures such as the Brief Mood
Introspection Scale (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) are too broad to detect individual changes in any
specific emotion. When Lambert et al. (2014) used their narrow measure of mood to measure
dental-pain salience, a significant increase in anxiety was found. Lambert et al. (2014) suggests
MS and dental pain provoke different emotions because the two situations are qualitatively
different experiences: unlike dental pain, death is an inevitable circumstance for everyone.
Participants can write about dental pain, but it is not an inevitable part of their future. In
conclusion, people feel anxious about dental pain because it is uncertain, but fearful for death
because it most certainly will happen.
If emotions are ultimately involved in TMT, it could be that the affective experience of
fear produces out-group derogation rather than an existential fear of death. Much like Control
Salience Theory (Fritsche et al., 2008), which claims that death is the ultimate lack of human
control, it is also possible that thoughts of death simply elicit an ultimate amount of fear.
Therefore, fear may be the impetus that produces out-group derogation and in-group support.
This assumption is reasonable as it aligns with the vast majority of mood-based research. Many
theorists have found that mood has the potential to produce behavioral and cognitive changes
within the individual. Happiness, sadness, anger, and fear are commonly studied and have been
shown to yield various changes in behavior, cognition, and judgment.
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Cognitive changes after mood induction
Within mood research, participants induced to feel sad report lower life satisfaction,
lower openness, and appear less friendly and confident. Conversely, participants induced to feel
happy express significantly higher levels of life satisfaction, smile more, appear friendlier, and
are more open-minded (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Forgas & Moylan, 1987). A sad mood can also
produce more socially desirable effects, such as a decrease in heuristic use and stereotypic
thinking. In contrast, a happy mood can actually increase reliance on heuristics and stereotypic
thinking (Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997; Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, &
Wolk, 1996; Park & Banaji, 2000).
Furthermore, experiencing fear or anxiety can also alter an individual’s behavior.
Lambert, Scherer, Schott, Olson, Andrews, O’Brien, and Zisser (2010) found that when
participants felt threatened after watching a video containing 9/11 footage, participants were
more likely to support a “hawkish” politician who called for severe action against an out-group.
Although watching a 9/11 film does not require participants to explicitly ponder their own death,
thoughts of death are likely to be associated with the devastating video footage. Interestingly,
Lambert et al. (2010) and classic TMT studies follow a similar format: death-related threat
followed by a measure of in-group support and out-group derogation. Lambert et al (2010) even
found results that aligned with TMT findings: participants who underwent MS fervently
supported the in-group leader more so than those who had not received the threat. Although
TMT and Lambert et al (2010) followed a very similar design, Lambert et al (2010) found
changes in participant anger and anxiety levels, whereas traditional TMT does not find affect
change. Again, these contradictory results emphasize the notion that TMT produces a change in
mood, but a more sensitive scale is needed to detect it.
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Appraisal tendency approach
In other studies of fear, Lerner and Keltner (2000) measured participants’ baseline fear
levels and found that those high in fear made more pessimistic assessments of the future than
those in other mood states. A related study found that participants high in fear appraised risky
situations more pessimistically (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Lerner and Keltner (2001) suggest
modification in behavior after a change in mood could be explained by the appraisal tendency
approach. The appraisal tendency approach posits that emotions trigger changes in physiology
and cognition, and these changes help the individual form a judgment of a novel situation or
object. Additionally, each situation requires a different appraisal, and each appraisal can produce
a different emotion. In turn, these different emotions can lead to various judgmental outcomes.
Theoretically, emotions exist to best prepare us for the given situation. Despite the functional
nature of mood, emotions can over-generalize to objects that are not related to the situation, and
it is in this instance where unnecessary judgments, prejudices, and opinions are formed (Lerner
& Kelter; Lambert et al., 2010)
Appraisal tendency approach and TMT. Fear produced by the appraisal tendency
approach may be one of the underlying mechanisms responsible for death anxiety and derogation
in TMT research. When examining MS effects through an appraisal tendency lens, participants
unconsciously appraise the situation of their inevitable death, and fear is the ensuing emotion.
The ensuing fear may unconsciously modify cognitions to prepare the individual to deal best
with death anxiety. Specifically, fear produced after MS may cause participants to cling to the
in-group and derogate the out-group. Initially clinging to in-groups may help propel the
participant out of death anxiety, but the participant’s fear may overgeneralize to groups of people
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who are not appropriate targets of derogation. Hence, over-generalization may explain why
researchers observe exaggerated prejudice after fear-inducing threats.
In a real world application, if a citizen in a war-torn society witnesses a violent act,
he/she may appraise the situation as dangerous and experience fear. The emotional experience of
“fear” then changes cognitions in order to best prepare the individual for the dangerous situation.
In order to alleviate fear, the citizen may seek protection from other in-group members and
experience hostility towards out-group members. According to evolutionary psychologists,
humans may have evolved to cooperate with members of their tribe in order to fend off
opponents and guard resources (Van Vugt, 2007; Navarrete, Olsson, Ho, Mendes, Thomsen, &
Sidanius, 2009). Within this perspective, those who learned to stick with the in-group in times of
peril survived and passed on genes. The appraisal tendency approach may have been a
mechanism that helped ancient humans survive and TMT research may be capturing this
psychological function that lingers on in modern day society. In sum, if fear is a prominent
mechanism that causes in-group support and out-group derogation after MS, then alterations to
the current model of TMT must be made to incorporate this development.
The Current Study
Due to this recent discovery of increase in fear after MS manipulation, I further
investigated how mood influences the psychological response to MS. As far as I know, no TMT
research has induced mood before the administration of MS and then observed the potential
buffering effects. If MS produces change in affect (fear), it is reasonable to assume that
manipulating a participant into a serene mood (Jallais & Gilet, 2010)—an affective state almost
opposite of fear—may buffer the effects of MS. Similarly, it is also reasonable to assume that
inducing a participant with a fearful mood may exacerbate the effects of MS. Additionally, if
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fear is one of the underlying mechanisms that produces derogation, then inducing a participant
into a fearful state should provoke a similar amount of derogation that is evoked in a classic MS
manipulation.
Overview of Study
In order to investigate whether a) various mood states can alter MS effects and b) a
fearful mood can produce derogation independent of MS, all participants were asked to write a
brief paragraph describing their political affiliation and opinion of current politics in America.
This description is used later in the out-group derogation measure. Participants were then
directed to complete a mood induction task. For this particular task participants wrote about a
time they felt either fearful or serene in order to induce fearful and serene moods. Participants in
the neutral mood condition wrote about mundane, everyday occurrences. This form of mood
induction, autobiographical recall, has been used in previous mood research and is thought to be
one of the most successful mood induction procedures (Jallais & Gilet, 2010; Bless et al., 1996;
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Siisser, 1994; Krauth-Gruber, S. & Ric, F., 2000; Strack, Schwarz, &
Gschneidinger, 1985; Park & Banaji, 2000). In order to measure out-group derogation,
participants were led to believe that there were two groups involved in this study, and that they
had been assigned to “group one.” Participants were informed that they were going to read an
essay written by a participant in “group two,” and that they would form an impression of the
author based on his or her essay. Participants were told that a “group two” member would also
read and form impressions of them based on one of their essays.
The first assessment of derogation was a behavioral measure. This method is an
adaptation of McGregor et al. (1998), in which aggression towards out-group members is
measured by how much hot sauce is allocated towards an opposing worldview author. Within
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this framework, the more hot sauce the participant allocates, the higher the level of derogation.
For the second measure of derogation, participants rated how much they liked/disliked and
agreed/disagreed with the author of the opposing essay. Lastly, participants will complete an
out-group measure that assesses prejudicial attitudes towards Muslims and Arabs.
Islamoprejudice measure
In order to measure opinions towards Muslims and Arabs I selected the Islamoprejudice
scale (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). When researchers asked participants whether they supported the
construction of a new mosque in the surrounding neighborhood, Islamoprejudice scores were
significantly predictive of whether participants supported construction, with Cronbach’s alpha
equaling .87. Kesebir (2014) also successfully used the Islamoprejudice scale to measure the
effects of humility on out-group derogation after MS. A main effect was found in which
participants high in humility had significantly lower Islamoprejudice scores than those low in
humility (Kesebir, 2014).
Additionally, the number of Muslim citizens in the US is growing rapidly due to
immigration and conversion and is estimated to be between 3 to 7 million (Pew Research Center,
2007; Amer & Bagasra, 2013). Furthermore, it is estimated that Islam will be the largest minority
religion within the next decade (Kobeisy, 2004; Amer & Bagasra, 2013). Alongside this
increase in population, Muslims have experienced a steady increase in prejudice and hate crimes
since 9/11 (Sweeney & Opotow, 2013; Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014; Amar & Bagasra, 2013). This
increase in population and tension between Anglo-Americans and Muslim Americans makes the
Islamoprejudice scale a relevant measure of in-group affiliation and out-group derogation.
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Hypotheses
For Hypothesis One, I predicted that there would be a main effect of mood, such that
those in the fearful mood condition would derogate out-group members significantly more than
those in the neutral or serene mood conditions (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Lambert et al., 2010;
Lerner & Keltner, 2000). To test this hypothesis, I conducted a 2 (salience: mortality or neutral)
x 3 (mood: serene, neutral, and fearful) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on each of the three
dependent variables: allocated hot sauce, derogation of author, and Islamoprejudice.
For Hypothesis Two, I predicted a main effect of MS such that those in the MS condition
would derogate to a greater extent than those in neutral salience across all three dependent
measures. Again, I used a 2x3 ANOVA to assess any main effects (Lambert et al., 2014; Landau
et al., 2004; Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; McGregor et al., 1998; Kesebir, 2014).
According to Hypothesis Three, I predicted that there would be an interaction between
the mood and MS conditions. Specifically, derogation would be buffered after MS when
participants were induced with a serene mood, but not when participants were induced with a
neutral or fearful mood. Additionally, I predicted that derogation would increase after neutral
salience when participants were induced with a fearful mood but not when they were induced
with a serene or neutral mood. A 2 x 3 ANOVA was used to detect any interactions across the
three dependent variables.
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Method
Participants and Design
Seventy-eight students from Introductory Psychology courses at a large Southeastern
American university participated in this study to partially fulfill a class requirement. Participants
signed-up via a participant pool and then were randomly assigned to conditions in a 3(serene,
fearful, neutral mood) x 2(mortality, neutral salience) between subjects design. Thirteen
participants were in each condition. The sample consisted of 52 females, 25 males, and one
participant who identified as “other.” In regards to class year, 42 participants were freshmen, 24
were sophomores, six were juniors, and six identified as seniors. Lastly, there were 64 white
participants, six Hispanic participants, three participants who identified as black or African
American, two Asian students, two students who identified as “other,” and one student who
identified as Middle Eastern.
Procedure
Participants waited for the study to begin in the waiting room of the study suite (1201
Miller Hall). In order to create the illusion that there were two separate groups of participants, I
greeted the participants with my research assistant. I explained to the participants that there were
“two groups in the study” and that the second group was “arriving 15 minutes later” and would
be led by my research assistant. Additionally, I explained that I had to divide the time slot “into
two groups at the last minute for confidentiality reasons.” I asked the participants if anyone
“received an email asking them to come 15 minutes later,” and then I proceeded to take role to
“ensure everyone was in the correct group.” After everyone was accounted for, I led the
participants to their study room. On the door of the study room was a sign that said “Kathryn
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Howard Group 1,” and a door close to group one’s room had a sign that said “Kathryn Howard
Group 2.”
Participants were given the choice to sit at any of the six desks available in the room.
After consent forms were signed and collected, I explained the agenda for the session.
Participants were informed that they were “engaging in a study on impression formation and the
various assumptions people make based on impressions.” I clarified that they were going to
respond to several prompts and that at the end session they would read a prompt randomly
assigned to them from a “group two” member. They were then informed that they were in the
“food preference condition” and that they would be making an assumption on how much a
“group two” member enjoyed spicy food based on their essay. I explained that in order to
measure assumptions in an objective, quantifiable manner, participants would pour the amount of
hot sauce into a cup that they thought the author of the essay would most enjoy. Participants
were told that the authors of the essays would actually consume the hot sauce during the study,
and then rate how much they enjoyed the sample. Lastly, participants were told that a
participant from “group two” would be forming impressions and assumptions about them. In
order to strengthen the illusion of the existence of another group, participants were informed that
“group two” was in the “music preference condition” and that at the end of the study, they would
listen to a music clip specifically prepared for them by a participant in “group two,” and then rate
how much they enjoyed it.
Ideological essays. Following the method for measurement of out-group derogation
from McGregor et al. (1998), participants were given a questionnaire with a prompt that asked
them to “briefly share their political views and opinion on politics in America.” At the top of the
page before the prompt, participants were asked to check the appropriate box in response to the
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question: “overall, I consider myself mostly a) liberal, b) moderately liberal, c) moderately
conservative, or d) conservative.”
Attached with the ideological essay prompt was a measure of how much the participant
enjoyed rock music and hot sauce. Participants indicated their preference on a 21 point rating
scale, ranging from one (no liking at all) and 21, “extreme liking.” This liking scale was
included in order to enhance the effectiveness of the illusion of another group. Participants were
told that the bogus “group 2” members filled out an identical scale, and that they would be able
to reference the bogus author’s response when deciding how much hot sauce to allocate. For
every participant, the bogus author indicated a “3” out of “21” on the liking scale for hot sauce.
This ensured participants understood that the bogus author did not like hot sauce, confirming that
if participants allocated a significant amount of hot sauce for the bogus “group 2” member to
consume, it could be viewed as a form of aggression.
Mood induction. In order to induce either fear or serenity depending on the randomly
assigned condition, the autobiographical recall mood induction from Bodenhausen, Kramer, and
Susser (1994) was used. For the fear condition, participants were asked to “recall, re-experience,
and write about an event that made them feel particularly fearful.” The method was identical to
Bodenhausen et al. (1994) except that the word “fear” was used instead of “happy.” Likewise,
participants in the serene condition were given the same prompt, but the word “serene” was used
instead of “happy.” Lastly, participants in the neutral condition were asked to “recall, reexperience, and write about an ordinary, routine day in their student life” (Krauth-Gruber et al.,
2000). As suggested by Strack, Schwarz, and Gshneidinger (1985), participants were asked to
“focus on concrete, vivid, experiential aspects of the event rather than on an abstract or objective
assessment of it.” Focusing on a specific, concrete memory may allow for a stronger affective
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experience and prevent against comparison effects (Strack et al., 1985). Participants were
informed that the researchers were interested in how people form impressions based on written
material and that they had 10 minutes exactly to complete the task (Bodenhausen et al., 1994).
MS induction. Directly after the mood induction, half of the participants received either
a MS induction or a NS induction. For MS, participants were induced using the method
developed by Greenberg et al. (1995) and used successfully by others (Greenberg et al., 1997;
McGregor et al, 1998; Shepard et al., 2011; Agroskin & Jonas, 2013; Fritsche & Jonas, 2008,
Lambert et al., 2014). To induce MS, participants were asked to 'Please briefly describe the
emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you" and "Jot down, as specifically as
you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically
dead." The NS induction was also modeled after Greenberg et al. (1995), in which participants
wrote about watching TV and “what thoughts about watching TV arouses” in them. This neutral
salience induction has been used as a reliable measure of neutral salience in previous TMT
research (Dechesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2000; Wisman & Goldenberg, 2005). Each
participant was given 10 minutes exactly to complete this task.
Directly after the MS induction, participants completed a packet of neutral word and
number games. The packet included a JMU word search, and four different Sudoku puzzles.
Word Searches and other number puzzles have been used in previous studies as a neutral filler
item (Landau et al., 2004; Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, & Weise,
2006). Participants worked on these puzzles for 10 minutes, as the literature has shown that the
passage of approximately 10 - 15 minutes is beneficial for the full effects of MS to occur (Arndt
et al., 1996; Arndt et al 1994; Simon et al., 1997).
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Theoretically, after MS is received, the individual uses his or her cognitive strategies to
suppress the troublesome thoughts of death (McGregor et al., 1998). After several minutes these
cognitive strategies allegedly wear out, and an individual is able to access death thoughts.
According to the theory, it is at this time when death thoughts are accessible that worldview
defense is used to buffer the death anxiety. Numerous studies have been completed assessing
worldview defense directly after MS and several minutes after MS, and these studies have found
worldview defense to be highest several minutes after the MS induction (Arndt et al., 1996;
Arndt et al., 1994; Simon et al., 1997).
Essay evaluation. While participants completed the puzzles, I gathered together the
essays from each participant. I explained to participants that I was momentarily stepping out of
the room to hand the essays to my research assistant in “group two” so that the essays could be
swapped between groups. My assistant waited in the “group two” study room, and received the
essays from the participants. In order to properly offend participants’ worldviews, the bogus
essay each participant received had to oppose the political affiliation that the participant
indicated. For example, if a participant indicated that they were conservative, they would
receive a bogus essay written from a liberal point of view that derogated conservatives. It was
my research assistant’s responsibility to assess how each participant identified politically, and
then assign the correct bogus essay for them to receive. After my research assistant completed
this task, she knocked on my door and handed me “group two’s essays.”
After 10 minutes, the puzzles were collected, and the opposing essays were distributed to
each participant. Those who identified as liberal, or moderately liberal, received this essay from
McGregor et al. (1998):
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“Don’t even get me started. Liberals are the cause of so many problems in this country,
it’s not funny. Not only that, but they get in the way of decent Americans who are trying
to solve all those problems that they created in the first place. The bleeding heart stance
they take, of trying to help everyone is a joke and incredibly stupid. How can they help
the world when they can’t even help themselves!? Do liberals put any thought into what
they believe? I don’t think so. Thankfully there are people in power that agree with me.
Those who indicated they were conservative or moderately conservative received this essay:
“Don’t even get me started. Conservatives are the cause of so many problems in this
country, it’s not funny. Not only that, but they get in the way of decent Americans who
are trying to solve all those problems that they created in the first place. The cold-hearted
stance they take, of trying to help only themselves is a joke and incredibly stupid. Do
conservatives put any thought into what they believe? I don’t think so. Thankfully there
are people in power that agree with me.”
After participants were given a chance to read the bogus essay and form an impression of
the author, hot sauce materials were distributed. Following the methodology from McGregor et
al. (1998), participants received the bogus preference scale, along with a plastic cup, and a bottle
of hot sauce. The hot sauce was composed of a Chile Habanero pepper mix, and was labeled as
“XXXTRA HOT.” The Elyucateco brand of hot sauce was used. Participants were instructed to
use the essay and the preference scale to decide how much hot sauce the author would most like
to consume. Participants were encouraged to “add as much or as little hot sauce” as they would
like, but were reminded that the author would “have to consume the entire sample” (McGregor et
al., 1998). After each participant poured their desired amount of hot sauce in the cup, they
sealed the lid and the cups and bottles were collected.
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Each participant was then asked to evaluate the author of the bogus essay using an
impression formation questionnaire (Greenberg et al., 1994). This questionnaire contained five
questions. Examples are: “How much do you like this person?” “How intelligent do you think
this person is?” and “How knowledgeable do you think this person is?” (See Appendix B for the
complete scale.) In Greenberg et al. (1994), a significant correlation of -.61 was found, in which
the more negatively a target was rated on the scale, the more hot sauce the target received.
Lastly, all participants completed the abridged Islamoprejudice scale (Kesebir, 2014;
Imhoff & Recker, 2012). Following Kesebir et al. (2014), subjects answered six questions on a
seven point rating scale from the original Islamoprejudice measure (Imhoff & Recker, 2012).
Sample items are “Compared to other religious and philosophical approaches Islam is rather
primitive,” “Any critique of the West brought forward by representatives of Islam is exaggerated
and unjustified,” and “Hostility against Muslims is an intolerable form of discrimination.”(See
Appendix C for full scale.) For this study, higher numbers on this scale indicated higher
prejudice towards Islam and Muslims.
Directly following the Islamoprejudice measure, participants completed a questionnaire
containing several demographic items addressing race, class year, gender, religion, and academic
major. On the back of the demographics sheet, participants were asked if they “knew anyone
else who had taken this study” and if they “knew anything about this study” before the session.
Lastly, participants were asked what they “thought the study was about.” These questions were
asked to ensure that participants were unaware of TMT and the main research questions. After
this last questionnaire was collected, participants were debriefed and the study was complete.
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Results
For Hypothesis One, I predicted that there would be a main effect of mood, such that
participants in the fearful mood condition would derogate out-group members significantly more
than those in the neutral or serene mood conditions (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Lambert et al.,
2010; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). To test this hypothesis, I conducted a 2 (salience: mortality or
neutral) x 3 (mood: serene, neutral, and fearful) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on each of the
three dependent variables: allocated hot sauce to author, derogation of author, and
Islamoprejudice. Participants did not allocate significantly more hot sauce in the fearful
condition (M = 3.39, SD = 4.46) than the neutral (M = 6.27, SD = 13.92) or serene conditions (M
= 5.02, SD = 9.48), F(2, 72) = .52, p = .595. Similarly, participants did not derogate the author
in the fearful condition (M = 35.16, SD = 6.41) significantly more than the neutral (M = 34.31,
SD = 6.03) or serene conditions (M = 35.12, SD = 7.25), F(2, 71) = .16, p = .857, (see Figure 1).
However, there was a main effect of mood that approached significance, F(2, 71) = 2.82, p =
.066, in which participants in the fearful condition (M = 23.44, SD = 5.63) reported higher
Islamoprejudice scores than participants in the serene (M = 20.31, SD = 5.99) and neutral (M =
20.04, SE = 5.11) conditions, (see Figure 2). Overall, Hypothesis One was not supported.
For Hypothesis Two, I predicted that there would be a main effect of salience, such that
participants in the MS condition would derogate out-group members significantly more than
those in the neutral salience condition. As in Hypothesis One, I conducted a 2 x 3 ANOVA on
each of the three dependent variables. Participants did not allocate significantly more hot sauce
in the MS condition (M = 5.31, SD = 9.36) than participants in the neutral salience condition (M
= 4.48, SD = 10.70), F(1, 72) = .42, p = .661. There was a main effect of salience on “derogation
of the author” that approached significance, F(1, 71) = 3.66, p = .06, in which participants in the
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MS condition (M = 36.29, SD = 6.66) derogated the author more than participants in the neutral
salience condition (M = 33.46, SD = 6.12), (see Figure 1). Lastly, participants in the MS
condition (M = 21.45, SD = 5.68) did not report higher Islamoprejudice than those in the neutral
salience condition (M = 21.03, SD = 5.83), F(1, 71) = .139, p = .711, (see Figure 2). In sum,
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
For Hypothesis Three I predicted there would be an interaction between mood and MS.
Specifically, I predicted that derogation would be buffered after MS when participants were
induced with a serene mood, but not when participants were induced with a neutral or fearful
mood. Additionally, I expected that derogation would increase after neutral salience when
participants were induced with a fearful mood but not when they were induced with a serene or
neutral mood. Again, I conducted a 2x3 ANOVA to analyze the possible interactions between
mood and salience across the three variables. In regards to hot sauce allocation, derogation of
out-groups after neutral salience and MS was not impacted by mood, F(2, 72) = .42, p = .661.
Additionally, derogation of the author after neutral salience or MS also was not mediated by
mood, F(2, 71) = .216, p = .806. Lastly, mood did not mediate Islamoprejudice scores, F(2, 71) =
.118, p = .889. In conclusion, there were no significant reactions in regards to the proposed
hypotheses; Hypothesis Three was not supported. See Table 1 for a review of group means.
A reliability analysis was conducted for both the author derogation scale and
Islamoprejudice scale. A Cronbach’s alpha of .82 was found for the author liking scale,
suggesting fairly high reliability. The Islamoprejudice scale found an acceptable Cronbach’s
alpha of .69.
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Exploratory Analysis
Due to the similarity of scores between the neutral and serene mood conditions on several
measures, it is possible that the serene induction may have elicited the same, or very similar,
responses from participants as the neutral mood induction. Although manipulation checks were
not administered, it appears that the serene mood induction probably did not provoke a serene
mood. Perhaps the act of being a participant, sitting in a strange room, filling out questionnaires,
and writing essays are not conducive factors for producing feelings of serenity. Because of these
reasons, the serene condition was eliminated, and the same data analyses that were used for the
original three hypotheses were run again.
Hypothesis One investigated the main effects of mood across the three dependent
variables. When excluding serene mood, participants in the fearful condition (M = 3.39, SD =
4.46) did not allocate more hot sauce than participants in the neutral condition (M = 6.27, SD =
13.92), F(1, 48) = .98, p = .327. Additionally, participants in the fearful condition (M= 35.16,
SD = 6.41) did not derogate the author more than those in the neutral condition (M = 34.31 SD =
6.03), F(1, 47) = .30, p = .587, (see Figure 3). However, participants in the fearful condition (M=
23.44, SD = 5.63) reported significantly higher Islamoprejudice than participants in the neutral
condition (M = 20.04, SD = 5.11), F(1, 47) = 4.96, p = .031, (see Figure 4). That is, a fearful
mood may lead to greater prejudice towards Islam.
Hypothesis Two analyzed the main effect of salience across the three dependent
variables. When excluding serene mood, participants in the MS condition (M = 4.85, SD = 7.26)
did not allocate more hot sauce to the author than those in the neutral salience condition (M =
4.81, SD = 12.85), F(1, 48) = .57, p = .454. However, participants in the MS condition (M =
36.48, SD = 5.96) derogated the author of the essay to a significantly greater extent than those in
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the neutral salience condition (M = 33.04, SD = 6.00), F(1, 47) = 4.15, p = .047, (see Figure 3).
Lastly, participants in the MS condition (MS = 21.76, SD = 5.65) did not report higher
Islamoprejudice than participants in the neutral salience condition (M = 21.65, SD = 5.64), F(1,
47) = .02, p = .712, (see Figure 4). In sum, MS may have influenced participants to judge the
author of the essay more negatively than participants in a neutral state.
After excluding the “serene” condition, no interactions between mood and salience were
found on any of the three dependent variables. It is probable that a fearful mood does not
exacerbate the effects of the MS manipulation. See Table 2 for a review of group means for
exploratory analysis.
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Discussion
Review of TMT
Within the framework of TMT, when people are reminded of their death, they are more
likely to support their in-group and derogate their out-group (Arndt et al., 1999; Greenberg et al.,
1990; Hayes et al., 2010). TMT researchers propose that this need for out-group derogation
arises from an existential threat to personal identity, and that changes in mood play no role in this
process (Greenberg et al; 1994., McGregor et al; 1998). However, a recent study found that when
assessing specific dimensions of mood rather than just “negative” or “positive” mood,
participants experienced an increase in fear after the MS manipulation (Lambert et al., 2014).
The current study aimed to further examine the mediating role of mood in TMT, specifically the
potential buffering effects of a serene mood and the exacerbating effects of a fearful mood. If a
fearful mood plays a powerful role in producing the reaction observed in TMT studies, then
inducing a serene mood and priming participants to feel “safe” and “secure” may buffer any
fearful emotions evoked by the MS manipulation. Likewise, if a fearful mood is indeed one of
the driving forces behind the TMT manipulation, then simply having participants write about
fear should produce out-group derogation.
For this study, the effect of mood on TMT was examined via three hypotheses: a)
participants in a fearful mood should report more derogation on all measures than those in a
neutral or serene mood, b) those in the MS condition should report more derogation on all
measures than those in the neutral salience group, and c)—an interaction between mood and
salience in which a serene mood should buffer the negative effects of the MS manipulation. A
2x3 ANOVA determined that these hypotheses were not supported.

32

Although no significant differences were found, group means for several of the
conditions reflected the expected patterns for the author derogation scale and Islamoprejudice
scale. As predicted, participants in the MS condition derogated the author of the opposing essay
more than those in the neutral salience condition. Additionally, participants in the fearful mood
condition reported higher Islamoprejudice scores than those in the neutral and serene condition.
Also, participants who were in both the MS condition and fearful mood condition derogated the
author to the greatest extend and reported the highest Islamoprejudice scores. Allocation of hot
sauce was the only dependent measure that did not display any results that moved in the expected
direction.
Limitations of Hot Sauce Measure
These seemingly erratic responses for allocation of hot sauce between conditions may be
due in part to several confounds with the hot sauce measure. In regards to the protocol, before
participants were informed to allocate hot sauce, they were directed to look at the bogus author’s
taste preference sheet. This sheet informed participants that the bogus author did not like hot
sauce. Despite being told to reference this sheet, several participants poured hot sauce before
consulting the author’s preference. Not examining this sheet may have affected the quantity that
some participants poured. Additionally, in two of the sessions, participants asked aloud in front
of all other participants if they “had to pour any hot sauce at all” because they noticed the author
“did not like hot sauce.” This comment possibly swayed how other participants in the room
responded. Furthermore, due to difficulties working out the kinks of this measure, some
participants received smaller or larger cups to pour hot sauce in during the early stages of this
study. It is possible that a bigger cup may provoke a larger allocation of hot sauce. Overall, this
dependent variable may have had too many confounds to provide legitimate, significant results.

33

Furthermore, the efficacy of the hot sauce measure, along with derogation of the author
and the Islamoprejudice scale was affected by several other design flaws and unfortunate
circumstances. First and foremost, the number of participants in the study may not have been
large enough to discern any significance. Due to the lull in the participant pool, it was difficult to
collect sufficient data in the allotted time. Additional participants may have provided enough
power in order to detect main effects for the MS and fear conditions.
Limitations of Mood Manipulation
Additionally, the autobiographical mood manipulation allowed for a limited amount of
control and consistency (Lerner & Kelter, 2000). Although most participants used the whole 10
minutes to record their responses, I had no control over the serene, routine, or fearful experiences
participants chose to write and contemplate about. For example, in the fear condition, some
participants wrote about severe topics, some of which included 9/11 trauma, near-fatal car
crashes, serious illness (personal or familial), missing siblings, date rape, and one participant
wrote about pulling a dead body out of the ocean while he/she was lifeguarding at the beach.
Other participants wrote about less severe topics, such as hiking on a steep mountain, staying
home alone at night, or walking home in the dark. These experiences are qualitatively different,
and therefore participants who wrote about higher-fear moments may have experienced a
stronger reaction and responded more severely to the dependent measures. This same logic also
applies to the MS condition, as I had no control over how participants chose to write and think
about their death.
Similar to the fear measure, I could not control how participants responded to the serene
condition. Not only did I lack control, but the nature of being a participant and writing an essay
may not have effectively produced feelings of serenity, even when participants recollected on
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serene moments. A more effective mood manipulation may involve exposing all participants to
the same, strong mood stimulus. For example, showing a video clip in order to induce fear and/or
serenity may be a more effective method.
In addition to the lack of control with the mood measures, there was no manipulation
check after the mood induction to ensure that the manipulation was effective. Because this check
was not incorporated in the study, I cannot be certain that participants did not experience
serenity. Furthermore, I cannot be certain that participants experienced fear—it may have been
another mood, or another factor entirely that caused a directional increase in Islamoprejudice in
the fear condition. Future studies should incorporate the use of a manipulation check in order to
ensure that the correct mood or response is elicited.
Review of Exploratory Analyses
Despite some of the limitations to this study, exploratory analyses revealed significant
differences between conditions. When analyzing the mean scores for Islamoprejudice and author
derogation, the serene condition and the neutral condition reported nearly identical means. A ttest between the two conditions revealed that a serene mood and a neutral mood were not
statistically different from one another. Unfortunately, due to the lack of a manipulation check,
it is impossible to know if a serene mood was even elicited. Regardless, these findings suggest
that a serene mood or the serene mood manipulation was ineffective in buffering the effects of
the MS manipulation.
Due to the lack of effectiveness of the serene mood manipulation and the similarity in
results between the serene and neutral mood conditions, exploratory analyses were run in which
the serene condition was excluded. Much like the previous findings, there was no interaction
between mood and salience in for any of the dependent measures. However, these exploratory
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analyses revealed a main effect of MS, in which those in the MS condition derogated the author
of the world view opposing essay significantly more than those in the neutral salience condition.
A main effect of mood was also found, in which participants in the fearful mood reported
significantly higher Islamoprejudice scores than those in the neutral mood condition. Again, no
significant interactions were found between mood and salience.
Interestingly, the MS condition increased derogation of the author but did not increase
Islamoprejudice. This finding is actually consistent with the MS literature: Previous studies have
found that once participants derogate an out-group, they relieve their need to derogate and assess
any succeeding groups in a neutral, basal, manner (Kesebir, 2014; McGregor et al., 1998;
Landau et al., 2006). In this study, all participants allocated hot sauce, then derogated the author,
and completed the Islamoprejudice measure last. If participants were in a neutral mood, they may
have felt no need to derogate Islam after they derogated the author. Conversely, participants in
the fearful + MS condition reported high derogation of the author and high Islamoprejudice
scores. Participants in this condition may still have felt a need to derogate Islam after they
derogated the author due to the fearful mood induction. This suggests that the effects of fear
may persevere longer than the effects of the MS manipulation.
In regards to the main effect of mood within the exploratory analyses, a fearful mood
significantly increased Islamoprejudice scores but had no effect on allocation of hot sauce or
author derogation. A fearful mood may have only affected Islamoprejduice because the two outgroups used in this study to measure derogation, (Islam and opposing political affiliation), differ
in several fundamental ways. Because participants are exposed to this author’s opinion for the
first time during the study, they have no preconceived notions about the author. In contrast, the
majority of participants probably already had knowledge of, or experiences with Islam, and may

36

have already had stereotypes for this group. Unfortunately, because of 9/11, current conflicts in
Gaza, and the constant media coverage of the war and terrorist groups, participants may have
entered the study with an already existing “fearful schema” for Islam (Amer & Bagasra, 2013;
Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014; Pyszczynski et al., 2009). It may be that the fearful mood induction
activated and intensified this schema, causing Islamoprejudice scores to increase. In fact, several
participants in the fearful condition wrote about trauma they personally experienced during 9/11,
therefore, the fearful condition may have primed Islamoprejudiced responses. Although
participants may have felt bothered or annoyed by the bogus author, the content of the essay
probably did not interact with their alleged fearful mood, preventing any change to author
derogation.
Secondly, approximately 50% of participants reported political apathy, and circled an
affiliation merely because “they felt they had to.” In their political prompts, some participants
explained that they “did not know anything about politics” or “did not care at all about politics.”
It may be that the political out-group was not strong enough to offend some participants. Overall,
it may be that this group of participants had stronger feelings about Islam than politics, and an
increase in a fearful mood may only increase derogation of groups that one feels strongly about.
A possible improvement to this study would be to vary the order in which dependent
measures are given to participants. In my study, every participant first allocated hot sauce, then
completed the author derogation scale, and ended with the Islamoprejudice scale. The order of
these measures may have influenced how participants responded to each succeeding measure. In
the current study MS did not affect Islamoprejudice, but as previously stated, this may have been
due to the fact that participants already derogated the author and therefore felt no more need to
derogate (McGregor et al., 1998). If the Islamoprejudice measure was given before the other
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measures, a significant effect of salience may have been elicited. Future studies could potentially
assess the effects of order of the dependent measures one each succeeding response.
Conclusion
Although several confounds and design difficulties may have influenced a lack of
significant findings for the main hypotheses, exploratory analysis found that MS increased
derogation of an opposing world view author, and thinking and writing about a fearful mood may
lead to greater Islamoprejudice. Previous TMT literature states that affect is not involved in the
derogation of out-groups, but this study found that a change in affect (fear) may indeed produce
increases in out-group derogation. Additionally, this study was able to find an increase in outgroup derogation without an MS manipulation. Because of these contradictory findings, future
research should explore in greater depth the influence of a fearful mood on other measures of
out-group derogation. If a fearful mood increases derogation of Islam, it is very possible that
derogation of other out-groups, such as different racial groups, may be affected by fear.
Most importantly, if future research confirms that fear is a prominent factor in out-group
derogation, than TMT researchers must integrate the effects of mood into the theoretical
framework. Specifically, TMT must incorporate the change in affective-fear after the MS
manipulation. Although a serene mood manipulation was not found to buffer the effects of MS,
other moods, or other mood manipulations may be effective. Discovering which psychological
factors have the potential to buffer people from the effects of MS is integral to TMT, as it makes
the theory beneficial and applicable in real life settings where death anxiety or fear occurs. As
our world population creeps from 7 billion to 8 billion, and societies become increasingly
connected via technological advances, understanding how to live peacefully with unlike-others is
necessary for peaceful, societal growth.
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Appendix A
Consent to Participate in Research
Identification of Investigators & Purpose of Study
You are being asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kathryn Howard from James
Madison University. The purpose of this study is to understand how people form impressions of
others based on written material. This study will contribute to the researcher’s completion of her
senior thesis.
Research Procedures
Should you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent
form once all your questions have been answered to your satisfaction. This study consists of
several questionnaires that will be administered to individual participants in (Miller lab 1201).
You will also be asked to write two short essays. Additionally, you will be asked to provide
answers to a series of questions related to current events, the process of impression formation,
and your opinion on various authors and selections of text.
Time Required
Participation in this study will require 60 minutes of your time.
Risks
The investigator does not perceive more than minimal risks from your involvement in this study
(that is, no risks beyond the risks associated with everyday life).
Benefits
There are no direct benefits to you for participating in this study; however, results from this
study may add to the already existing knowledge of impression formation.
Confidentiality
The results of this research will be presented at the senior thesis symposium. The results of this
project will be coded in such a way that the respondent’s identity will not be attached to the final
form of this study. The researcher retains the right to use and publish non-identifiable data.
While individual responses are confidential, aggregate data will be presented representing
averages or generalizations about the responses as a whole. All data will be stored in a secure
location accessible only to the researcher. Upon completion of the study, all information that
matches up individual respondents with their answers will be destroyed.
Participation & Withdrawal
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to choose not to participate. Should you
choose to participate, you can withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.
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Questions about the Study
If you have questions or concerns during the time of your participation in this study, or after its
completion or you would like to receive a copy of the final aggregate results of this study, please
contact:
Kathryn Howard
Psychology
James Madison University
howardka@dukes.jmu.edu

Dr. Kevin J Apple
Department Head of Psychology
James Madison University
Telephone: (540) 568 2555
applekj@dukes.jmu.edu

Questions about Your Rights as a Research Subject
Dr. David Cockley
Chair, Institutional Review Board
James Madison University
(540) 568-2834
cocklede@jmu.edu
Giving of Consent
I have read this consent form and I understand what is being requested of me as a participant in
this study. I freely consent to participate. I have been given satisfactory answers to my
questions. The investigator provided me with a copy of this form. I certify that I am at least 18
years of age.

______________________________________
Name of Participant (Printed)
______________________________________
Name of Participant (Signed)

______________
Date

______________________________________
Name of Researcher (Signed)

______________
Date
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Appendix B
Please respond to the following questions based on your impression of the author of the essay you
just read

1) How much do you like this person?
1

2

Totally

3

4

Very
much

5

6

Moderately

7

8

Somewhat

9
Not at
all

2) How intelligent do you think this person is?
1

2

Totally

3

4

Very
much

5

6

Moderately

7

8

Somewhat

9
Not at
all

3) How knowledgeable do you think this person is?
1

2

Totally

3

4

Very
much

5

6

Moderately

7

8

Somewhat

9
Not at
all

4) How much do you agree with this person’s opinion?
1

2

Totally

3

4

Very
much

5

6

Moderately

7

8

Somewhat

9
Not at
all

5) From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s opinion is?
1
Totally

2

3
Very
much

4

5
Moderately
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6

7
Somewhat

8

9
Not at
all

Appendix C
Scale for Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam

Strongly
agree

Agree

(1)

(2)

Somewhat
disagree

(3)

Neither agree nor
disagree

Somewhat
disagree

(4)

Disagree

(5)

Strongly
disagree

(6)

(7)

1. Compared to other religious and philosophical approaches Islam is rather primitive.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

2. Any critique of the West brought forward by representatives of Islam is exaggerated and
unjustified.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(6)

(7)

(6)

(7)

3. Hostility against Muslims is an intolerable form of discrimination.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

4. Islam and Christianity share the same universal ethical principles.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

5. I think Islamic religion and its aggressive sides predispose it towards proximity to terrorism.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

6. Muslims and their religion are so different from us that it would be naive to demand an equal
access to all positions in society.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
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(5)

(6)

(7)

Tables
Table 1. Initial Analysis.

Hot Sauce

Author Derogation

Islamoprejudice

Main effect of Mood

F = .52

F = .16

F = 2.83

Main effect for Salience

F = .128

F = 3.66

F = .14

Interaction between
Mood and Salience
Means for Serene Mood

F = .42

F = .22

F = .12

M = 5.02, SD = 9.48

M = 35.12, SD = 7.25

M = 20.31, SD = 5.96

Means for Neutral Mood

M = 6.27, SD = 13.92

M = 34.31, SD = 5.32

M = 20.04, SD = 5.11

Means for Fearful Mood

M = 3.39, SD = 4.46

M = 35.24, SD = 6.82

M = 23.45, SD = 5.63

Means for MS

M = 5.31, SD = 9.36

M = 36.31, SD = 6.66

M = 21.51, SD = 5.68

Means for NS

M = 4.48, SD = 10.70

M = 33.46, SD = 6.12

M = 21.03, SD = 5.83

Hot Sauce

Author Derogation

Islamoprejudice

F = .98

F = .30

F = 4.96*

F = .00

F = 4.15*

F = .02

F = .569

F = .10

F = .14

M = 6.27, SD = 13.92

M = 34.31, SD = 6.03

M = 20.04, SD = 5.11

M = 3.39, SD = 4.45

M = 35.16, SD = 6.41

M = 23.44, SD = 5.63

M = 4.85, SD = 7.26

M = 36.48, SD = 5.96

M = 21.76, SD = 5.65

M = 4.81, SD = 12.85

M = 33.04, SD = 6.00

M = 21.65, SD = 5.64

Table 2. Exploratory analysis

Main effect of Mood
Main effect for Salience
Interaction
Means for Neutral
Mood
Means for Fearful Mood
Means for MS
Means for NS
* = p < .01
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Figures
Figure 1. Initial Analysis for Author Derogation
38

37

36
MS

35

NS
34

33

32
Serene

Neutral

Fearful

Figure 2. Initial Analysis for Islamoprejudice
25

24

23
MS

22

NS
21

20

19
Serene

Neutral

Fearful
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Figures Cont.
Figure 3. Exploratory Analysis for Author Derogation
38
37
36
35
MS

34

NS
33
32

31
30
Neutral

Fearful

Figure 4. Exploratory Analysis for Islamoprejudice
24
23.5
23
22.5
22
MS

21.5

NS

21

20.5
20
19.5
19
Neutral

Fearful
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